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Abstract
The Distributed Network Protocol v3.0 (DNP3) is
one of the most widely used protocols, to control na-
tional infrastructure. Widely used interactive packet
manipulation tools, such as Scapy, have not yet been
augmented to parse and create DNP3 frames (Biondi
2014). In this paper we extend Scapy to include
DNP3, thus allowing us to perform attacks on DNP3
in real-time. Our contribution builds on East et al.
(2009), who proposed a range of possible attacks on
DNP3. We implement several of these attacks to vali-
date our DNP3 extension to Scapy, then executed the
attacks on real world equipment. We present our re-
sults, showing that many of these theoretical attacks
would be unsuccessful in an Ethernet-based network.
Keywords: substations , Distributed Network Proto-
col 3.0, DNP3, critical Infrastructure security, Scapy
1 Introduction
Despite the prevalence of Industrial Control System
(ICS) networks connected to corporate IT networks,
there are limited techniques that can be used to cor-
rectly detect cyber-attacks or forms of intrusion on
industrial networks. To develop signature-based In-
trusion Detection Systems (IDSs), attack signatures
are required to help identify malicious network traf-
fic. By using real critical infrastructure equipment for
the attacks, it shows the realism of the attacks. Prior
to this paper, not only did few sets of DNP3 attack
signatures exist, but there was no easy way to cre-
ate malicious network traffic. Hence, there is a need
to enhance tools, such as the interactive packet ma-
nipulation Python library Scapy, that exist for tradi-
tional IT communication networks, such as Scapy, to
include control system protocols. Our DNP3 exten-
sion of Scapy allows sets of DNP3 attack signatures
to be easily created.
The outline of our paper proceeds as follows: Sec-
tion 2 describes the relevant background information
of previous research in Critical Infrastructure secu-
rity for DNP3. In Section 3 we provide an overview
of DNP3. We describe our attack tool that executes
our DNP3 extension to Scapy in Section 4 and our
attacks and their results in Section 5, and we then
conclude in Section 6.
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2 Related Work
There is currently ongoing research to help secure
control systems using DNP3 and various other control
system protocols. Lee et al. (2014) simulated a DNP3
attack using OpenDNP3. The research involved a
small scale testbed. The testbed simulated actuators
and sensors of a hydro-power system. The attacks
using DNP3 were conducted on computers simulating
DNP3 systems and were not tested on real equipment
used in industry.
Researchers at the Sandia National Laboratory
Urias et al. (2012) created testbeds to demonstrate at-
tacks on SCADA Systems by exploiting network vul-
nerabilities in a corporate network. The teams man-
aged to perform several attacks on an ethernet-based
SCADA system which had, among other SCADA pro-
tocols, DNP3-based communications. These attacks
were general to an industrial network.
East et al. (2009) identified 28 attacks and 91
threats through their taxonomy and analysis of the
DNP3 specification. These attacks were all theoreti-
cal attacks, based on the specification of DNP3.
Although there is clearly research interest in ICS,
in particular DNP3, there has been little research into
attacks that work on real-world critical infrastructure
equipment, to aid in the development of IDS attack
signatures. We selected three of East et al. (2009)
theoretical attacks, the Length Overflow attack, Ad-
dress Alteration attack, and Configuration Capture
attack, as we found these attacks interesting. We
tested each of the attacks on real-world equipment
using our DNP3 extension to Scapy.
3 DNP3 Overview
A typical electricity distribution company’s substa-
tion will have an operations centre, making use of
master devices, to manage multiple slave devices run-
ning in outstations that are usually at a remote lo-
cation. These devices can be configured to communi-
cate using DNP3 over an Ethernet connection using
TCP/IP. The DNP3 frames, shown in Figure 1, are
layered within a TCP frame.
A DNP3 frame begins with a start (START) field
to identify the beginning of the frame, which is then
followed by the length field (LEN), used to pro-
vide the length in octets of the entire DNP3 frame.
The control (CTRL) field defines the frames direc-
tion, transaction initiator, and function. The desti-
nation field (DST) identifies the destination for the
frame, whereas the source field (SRC) identifies the
source of the frame. A Cyclic Redundancy Check
(CRC) field in the data link layer provides integrity
for the other eight octets of the data link segment. A
CRC field is inserted after every sixteen octets (data
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Figure 1: Structure of a DNP3 Frame
chunks) to keep the DNP3 frame’s Integrity (East
et al. 2009, IEEE Standard for Electric Power Sys-
tems Communications-DNP3 2012, Curtis 2005).
The Transport segment, as shown in Figure 1, is
used to for data reassembly in the receiving device
for fragmented DNP3 Frames. We implemented the
Transport segment in our DNP3 Scapy extension, al-
lowing us to manipulate and corrupt the reassembly
process in the receiving device.
The application fragment begins with an applica-
tion control (App CTRL) field, which is made of
several sub-fields. The unsolicited (UNS) field flags
that the fragment is an unsolicited response. If the
UNS flag is unset, then the fragment is associated
with a sequence number. The sequence (SEQ) field is
used to assure the segments are not duplicated, miss-
ing and that they are in order, as the sequence num-
ber increments on each fragment. The Function Code
(FN Code) field is used to identify the purpose of the
fragment. There exists 34 defined function codes for
application requests. A response DNP3 frame would
contain additional the Internal Indications (IIN) to
indicate the state and conditions of a slave device.
4 Attack Tool
To ensure that an attack tool is able to create appro-
priate attack signatures for the development and test-
ing of IDSs, we identify the necessary requirements
for our DNP3 extension by analysing the 34 theoret-
ical attacks described in East et al.’s 2009 taxon-
omy, by which we identified the following three criti-
cal requirements for our DNP3 attack tool. Spoofing
frames, Capture frames, and modify Frames. These
requirements allow the user to send or modify mes-
sages to target devices, in order to manipulate the
target’s functionality or cause it to malfunction.
The DNP3 extension allows a user to craft a DNP3
frame, and layer the frame with each DNP3 segment
to manipulate the fields inside the crafted frame. To
create each of the DNP3 frame segments, we ex-
tended the Packet class of the Scapy library, and
closely followed the DNP3 specification (IEEE Stan-
dard for Electric Power Systems Communications-
DNP3 2012). Our Scapy extension is able to process
the data chunks and generate the CRC values for each
of the data chunks when a segment within the DNP3
frame is updated. To determine if the IIN field is
required, we checked the DIR field in the data link
control function. As part of our extension we did not
implement the DNP3 data objects, instead we must
construct the object payload from raw hex values.
5 Attacks
To evaluate our Scapy implementation of DNP3, we
implemented a series of theoretical attacks described
by East et al. (2009). The successful execution of each
attack required the interception of all TCP frames,
followed by the modification of the DNP3 payload,
before forwarding the reconstructed frame on to its
intended destination.
5.1 Setup
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Figure 2: Testbed network setup
To perform our attacks, we used a testbed setup
consisting of critical infrastructure equipment used in
the real world. The testbed setup made use of the
one-to-one network architecture (see Figure 2). The
testbed used a Supervisory Control and Data Acqui-
sition (SCADA) gateway as the master device and an
Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) as the slave de-
vice. To connect the master and slave devices, we
used three interconnecting layer 2 industrial network
switches. The master was attached to switch 1, and
the slave to switch 3. The attacker laptop was con-
nected to switch 3. To allow us to monitor the ex-
periments, we configured a mirror port to listen to
all network traffic on the master device’s port. All of
the mirrored traffic was captured on a separate lap-
top running Wireshark. We had the ability to see,
via Wireshark and switch mirror ports, what was be-
ing sent to and from the slave IED and the master
SCADA Gateway, and being received and sent by the
attacker.
As part of the setup, we configured the master to
request class object variables from the slave device
using a “READ” DNP3 request message. The mas-
ter would request data using DNP3 class variables,
identified as Class 1, Class 2, Class 3, then finally
Class 123. The slave device would send a DNP3 re-
sponse message containing the relevant values of the
requested classes after each DNP3 request. To phys-
ically indicate DNP3 communication, we also config-
ured a mechanism to illuminate an LED on the slave,
in response to a button push on the LED’s corre-
sponding button. The mechanism involved (see Fig-
ure 2) the slave IED sending an unsolicited DNP3 re-
sponse to the master device. The Confirm is followed
CRPIT Volume 161 - Information Security 2015
68
by a “SELECT OPERATE” DNP3 message from the
master, resulting with the LED on the IED to turn
on. Therefore, if the LED on the IED illuminates
then a message has flowed from the slave device to
the master device, advising a change of state. Our
physical indicator can represent something as signifi-
cant as a circuit breaker opening or an indication of
a running motor.
5.2 Eavesdropping
Before any other attack could successfully be exe-
cuted, we needed to take control of the communica-
tions between the slave IED and the master gateway.
Therefore, for our first attack, our objective was to in-
tercept, and eavesdrop all network traffic between the
master and slave devices, through the use of Address
Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache poisoning.
Results As a result of the ARP cache poisoning,
the attacker intercepted all frames, then redirected
the frame on to it’s intended destination. During the
eavesdropping attack, there was a manipulation of the
MAC addresses by the attacker using our tool, this
can be seen in Figure 3. As can be seen, the Source
(MAC xx:15:b8) on the first line of Figure 3 is at-
tempting to send a TCP message to a Destination
(MAC xx:80:e2). However, the message first goes to
our attacker machine, Toshiba 58:77:b3, on row one
of Figure 3. The attacker’s machine then updated
the addresses and then the same message is sent from
Toshiba 58:77:b3 on to the intended recipient, being
xx:80:e2, on row two of Figure 3. Similar manipula-
tions can also be seen in the pair of messages on rows
3 and 4 of Figure 3.
Figure 3: Eavesdropping Attack - Wireshark capture
screen-shot of communication on the Attacker’s ma-
chine
During the faithful forwarding, the physical indica-
tion mechanism was successful as the LED did illumi-
nate on the button press from the slave device, but we
note there was an increased delay between the button
press and the actual lighting of the LED. This meant
that the delay added by the frame manipulation of
our attacker computer was inside the tolerances of
the critical infrastructure devices we tested.
5.3 Address Alteration
The second attack performed was East et al’s des-
tination address alteration attack (East et al. 2009).
The objective of the attack is to intercept and modify
the DNP3 destination address of each DNP3 Frame
(shown in the DST field of Figure 1). Note: the
DNP3 destination address, for example “10”, is dif-
ferent from the ethernet destination address (which
is a MAC address). Our master device was assigned
the address of ‘0’, whereas the slave device was as-
signed the address of ‘10’. For the address alteration
attack, we pass the intercepted frame into a function
where the DNP3 destination address is modified to
be ‘2’. According to East et al, changing the desti-
nation of a the DNP3 frame may cause other devices
to reply or the intended device will fail to receive the
message. We performed this attack to see if our ex-
tension is capable of altering the DNP3 destination
address. After updating the DST field, we then had
to recalculate and update the DNP3 data link CRC
field (see Figure 1).
Results After analysing the network capture from
the attacker, we were able to see that all DNP3 ad-
dresses passing through the attacker were updated
regardless of its DNP3 destination address. Our mir-
ror capture of the master device shows all messages
sent to the master had the destination address of ‘2’.
During the address alteration attack our physical
indication mechanism failed meaning the LED did not
illuminate on the button press from the slave device.
This attack has some interesting practical limita-
tions. If the intention is to forward a frame meant
for one physical device to another physical device,
this will not work as the surrounding TCP connec-
tion would need to be established with the second de-
vice. Therefore, the only way this attack could have a
result of an action being taken by a different master,
would be if there were multiple masters configured on
the one device.
As a further development for this test, we config-
ured a second address on our device, but the slave
device had a limitation that, although it could have
multiple masters, each of the masters needed to be
at a separate IP address. Our intention was to have
two physical indication mechanisms, for the two dif-
ferent addresses on the one device. The attack would
mean that pressing the button for one physical indica-
tion mechanism would activate the other physical in-
dication mechanism. The limitation that different IP
addresses are required for different DNP3 addresses,
means that the TCP layer would send the response
to the updated DNP3 address to a different physical
device. This attack may work in a serial environment,
but there seems no conceptual way for the attack to
work in an ethernet-based environment.
5.4 Length Overflow
For our next experiment, the objective of the attack
is to intercept and modify the length field of a DNP3
payload to a new length of 44 octets. The CRC field
also needed to be recalculated and updated to reflect
the new length value. We conducted this attack on
every frame containing a DNP3 payload. East et al
expects that the length overflow attack will result
in “data corruption, unexpected actions and device
crashes” (East et al. 2009).
Results We analysed the traffic capture from the
attacker’s interface. We can see that all DNP3 frames
from the slave device had the length field updated to
44. Analysis of the new frames using Wireshark reveal
that manipulated frames are flagged as malformed.
Further, since the DNP3 message is part of the TCP
payload, adjusting the length means that some of the
encapsulating TCP frame is now shown as part of the
DNP message. Wireshark flagging an error is only
an indication that the target device would also reject
the frame. However, during this length overflow at-
tack, our physical indication mechanism failed as the
LED did not illuminate on the button press from the
slave device meaning that the DNP3 devices we were
testing also rejected these frames. As such, the at-
tack becomes a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. We
also inspected each device’s commissioning tool, and
found no indication of errors or data corruption. It
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may seem that there is potential, if there were mul-
tiple DNP3 payloads inside the one TCP frame, that
the first DNP3 message could consume part of the sec-
ond message and still be a valid message. However,
since the CRC check at the end of a DNP3 message is
every 16 octets and at the start of the (next) DNP3
message is after 8 octets there is almost no combina-
tion of two messages that would result in a working
combined message due to length alteration.
5.5 Configuration Capture
The objective of this attack is to assert that the con-
figuration file of the target outstation is corrupted.
East et al. (2009) believed that this would cause the
master to transmit a new configuration file to the
slave. allowing the attacker to intercept the config-
uration file to use in a replay attack.
To implement this attack we set the 5th bit in the
second Internal Indications (IIN) field (see Figure 1)
to true. We performed this attack to see if firstly our
extension is capable to updating the IIN field of a
DNP3 fragment without interrupting the unsolicited
response, and secondly to capture the upload of a new
configuration.
We conducted two attacks. For the first attack
we were able to intercept all messages between the
master and slave devices, but we only manipulated
frames that did not contain an unsolicited message.
This means that our physical indication mechanism
was excluded from the attack. For the second attack,
the attacker intercepted all DNP3 frames, manipulat-
ing the 5th bit of the second octet in the IIN of all
frames.
Results During the first configuration capture at-
tack, the physical indication mechanism was success-
ful as the LED did illuminate the button press from
the slave device. After analysing the traffic capture
from the attackers interface in Wireshark, we noticed
there was no traffic indicating the transfer of con-
figuration files in response to the solicited messages
which did have their IIN field updated. During the
second configuration capture attack, our physical in-
dication mechanism failed, meaning the LED did illu-
minate on the button press from the slave device. Af-
ter analysing the captured traffic from the attacker,
again there was no traffic indicating the transfer of
configuration files.
The equipment we were using had a full deploy-
ment configuration used in critical infrastructure pro-
tection, before the specifics of our tests. Even so,
the master did not have configurations for the slaves
stored, and thus there was no potential for this attack
to result in the master sending new configuration files.
The configuration of the slave takes several minutes
from an engineering workstation, all of which time
the device is not functioning. Since such a downtime
is unacceptable in a critical infrastructure environ-
ment, many critical infrastructure environments may
not store configurations on their master devices for
automatic re-deployment at unspecified times due to
this corruption assertion. Our result and the standard
configuration of these critical infrastructure devices
suggests that East et al.’s theoretical attack would
rarely work.
6 Conclusion
In conclusion, we presented our DNP3 Scapy exten-
sion and implement a series of East et al.’s 2009 theo-
retical DNP3 attacks on real critical infrastructure
Attack Intercepted Modified LED
Forwarding 400 0 True
Address Alteration 50 30 False
Length Overflow 400 15 False
Config Capture 100 8 True
Config Capture 2 100 18 False
Table 1: Results of Attacks. Only DNP3, not ether-
net, modifications shown
equipment. In Table 1 we outline the number of
frames intercepted by the attack tool, the number
of intercepted frames that contained a DNP payload
that were modified beyond changing the IP addresses
the intended recipient’s IP address, and the result
of the physical response mechanism as outlined in
Section 5.1. For each of the attacks conducted we
observed that our attack tool was able to intercept
frames from both the master and slave devices. As
can be seen by the results of our tests, many of East
et al.’s theoretical attacks have limited chances of suc-
cess on real world equipment. However, other attacks
are more plausible and we will present these attacks
in future work.
The results from our attacks on the critical infras-
tructure equipment validate that Scapy is a suitable
tool for attack signature generation for DNP3, as our
tool was able to create and parse DNP3 frames in
real-time. In closing, our tool will assist with the de-
velopment attack signatures for IDSs.
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